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The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental 
motivators of human behaviour, typically by asking participants to share windfall 
endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, common observation is that 
proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment 
than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: 
money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants 
react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a 
Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the 
shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that 
typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task 
undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more 
effortful (i.e. screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that 
considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual 
decision making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy 
design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that 
people face.  
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Windfalls Versus Earnings 
 
As readers of this journal will be well aware, the ultimatum game was designed to try to 
shed light on the fundamental motivators of human behavior. To recap, in a typical 
ultimatum game, a proposer is asked to offer some share of an endowment that he has 
been given to a responder. If the responder accepts the offer the proposer is left with the 
remainder of his endowment, but if the responder rejects the offer then both the responder 
and the proposer get nothing. Standard rational choice theory predicts that the responder 
will accept whatever is offered – because anything is better than nothing – and thus that 
the proposer will offer next to nothing. Those who have undertaken tests of the ultimatum 
game have concluded that the predictions of rational choice theory are wrong: proposers’ 
mean offers tend to exceed 40% of their endowments, and offers of less than 20%, 
although rare, are rejected half of the time (e.g., see Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Henrich 
et al., 2005; Roth, 1995). 
 
It has been suggested that these seemingly high offers by proposers are motivated by a 
concern for fairness in the distribution of final outcomes. The dictator game was created 
to test this hypothesis, where an allocator is asked to give some share of his endowment 
to a recipient and that is the end of the game. Rational choice theory predicts that the 
allocator will give the recipient nothing, but mean allocations still tend to hover at 20-
30% of the endowment, albeit with around 20-30% of allocators typically giving nothing 
(e.g., Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). The dictator game 
results therefore imply that although people are in general motivated by considerations of 
fairness in final outcomes to some degree, a concern for the possibility of being punished 
for perceived greed in the ultimatum game appears to explain much of the high proposer 
offers. In short, ultimatum game offers are driven in large part by a strategic form of self-
interest.  
 
In most studies that apply the ultimatum and dictator games, however, the endowments 
are simply given to the proposers and allocators – that is to say, the endowments are 
windfalls. In our daily lives, most of us are rarely fortunate enough to receive such 
windfalls; rather, our endowments are more likely to be earned. Therefore, one may 
legitimately question whether economic games with windfall endowments really reveal 
that much about people’s motivations in their actual real-world decisions. If players in the 
ultimatum and dictator games had to undertake tasks to earn the endowments, then their 
perception of property rights might substantively influence their responses. As 











Table 1: Studies with Earned Endowments in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games 
Authors  Game  Earners  Results 
Cherry et al. (2002) Dictator Allocators answered >95% of allocators  
     a quiz to earn   gave nothing 
     $10-40       
Carlsson et al. (2013) Dictator Allocators answered Mean allocation (to  
     a survey on use of  charity) = 19% of  
     supermarket bags   endowment 
for 50 yuan  
Oxoby and  Dictator Allocators answered Allocators gave nothing  
Spraggon (2008)   a test to earn $10-40 
Oxoby and  Dictator Recipients answered Mean allocation >50%   
Spraggon (2008)   a test to earn $10-40 of endowment (when  
        recipients did well on test) 
Bekkers (2007) Dictator Allocators earned $9 They could give all 
     for completing a earnings or nothing to  
     questionnaire   charity; 94.3% gave nothing  
Ruffle (1998)  Dictator Recipients answered Recipients who did well 
     a test and earned   were given higher share  
     $4 if they did badly of the endowment than if  
     and $10 if they  endowment size was not 
     did well  determined by performance 
Ruffle (1998)  Ultimatum Responders answered Responders who did well 
     a test and earned    were given higher share  
     $4 if they did badly  of the endowment than if  
     and $10 if they endowment size was not 
     did well  determined by performance 
 
 
Specifically, the studies listed in Table 1 found that if allocators earn the endowments in 
dictator games then they tend to give a lower share to recipients than that typically 
observed with windfall endowments, while if recipients earn the endowments the 
allocators will give them more. That is, if people earn the endowments a perception that 
they are deserving influences the players’ responses, which dominates any consideration 
of equality in final outcomes. There is less evidence on earned endowments in the 
ultimatum game, but what evidence there is appears to point towards the same 
conclusion.  
 
I therefore undertook a small study to try to test whether proposers and responders in the 
ultimatum game make decisions over earned endowments that are more consistent with 
the predictions of rational choice theory than those typically observed with respect to 




A Small Study 
 
The participants were required to either build a Lego model or to spend some time sorting 
out screws into their various lengths, and were informed that they would be paid for 
completing these tasks. The reason why they were exposed to either Lego building or 
screw sorting was because I wanted to test whether their responses depended on what I 
thought were qualitatively different tasks (I expected the Lego building task to be the less 
arduous of the two, on which more later). One hundred and twenty participants, 
comprised of university staff and students, built the Lego model, and took a mean time of 
23 minutes (mode: 20 minutes) to complete their task. A different group of 120 university 
staff and students each spent 20 minutes sorting out screws by their sizes. Perhaps 
consistent with my expectation that the screw sorting was the more arduous, 52 
participants stated that they enjoyed that task, compared to 114 participants who stated 
that they enjoyed building the Lego model.     
 
After the respondents had completed their tasks they were told that they had earned £10 
for their efforts. They were then asked how much of their earnings they would be willing 
to share with an anonymous person who had done nothing. The participants were told that 
they would be left with their earnings minus their offer if the other person accepted their 
offer, and would be left with nothing if the other person rejected their offer. They were 
not told that the other person would actually receive their offer if they were to accept it, 
although most respondents probably implicitly believed that to be the case. The 
participants thus assumed the position of proposers in an ultimatum game with earned 
endowments. In addition to their earnings from the ultimatum game, the respondents 
were paid a take-home fee of £5, which resulted in 227 of the 240 respondents leaving 
with more than the £10 that they initially earned from the task that they undertook.  
   
After acting as proposers, the participants were also placed in the position of responders 
in the earnings-related ultimatum game summarised above. That is, they were asked to 
imagine that they knew someone who had been paid £10 for undertaking the Lego 
building or screw sorting task that they had themselves done. They were then asked to 
state the minimum share of the £10 that they would be prepared to accept if a person who 
had undertaken the task were asked to share their earnings with them, in the knowledge 
that a refusal to accept the offer would leave the proposer with nothing. These responses 
were used to determine whether another participant’s offer when placed in the position of 
a proposer was accepted. For example, if participant n’s answer when assuming the 
position of a proposer was £x and participant (n-1)’s answer when assuming the position 
of a responder ≤ £x, participant n received £(10-x); if participant (n-1)’s answer was > £x, 
participant n received nothing from the ultimatum game. 
 
I appreciate that many might object to the fact that responders in this study were not 
financially incentivised. The reason why the proposers were also asked to serve as 
responders was because by having actually undertaken the task that was required to earn 
the endowment they would be able to fully identify with all that the task entails. Had 
separate financially incentivised participants been used to serve as responders, they could 
have merely been informed of the tasks without having to undertake them, but that would 
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have come with the possible cost of them failing to appreciate the work that the tasks 
require. Alternatively, separate participants could have been asked to undertake the tasks 
without payment, but this may have led to much difficulty in securing sufficient 
participants, and, moreover, proposers could not then have been asked to share their 
earnings with people who had not undertaken the task. Or the respondents could have 
been financially incentivised when placed in the position of both proposers and 
responders, but this would have necessitated a complicated experiment design and may 
have confounded the proposer-responder answers. On balance, parsimony and task 
appreciation were prioritised over the possible influence of financial incentives on 
participant answers in this study, but I acknowledge that this is not the last word on these 
matters and I welcome further studies that use different methods to test the influence of 
proposer-earned endowments on the ultimatum game.        
 
The participants were also asked to respond to a number of other hypothetical 
unincentivised scenarios. The possible problems of using non-incentivised questions in 
these types of economic games are acknowledged – for example, one might legitimately 
expect that in a hypothetical dictator game, people may express more generosity than if 
they faced real financial incentives. One could counter by claiming that the temporal 
proximity of the hypothetical games to the incentivised game may have made it quite 
likely for the participants to relate psychologically to the later games also being 
incentivised, but their responses to these are reported here only for secondary 
consideration by those who might find some value in them, perhaps as inputs for 
hypothesis building.  
 
After answering the question from the perspective of an ultimatum game proposer, the 
respondents were asked how much of their £10 earnings they would have offered to a 
responder if the responder had undertaken a task identical to the one that they had done 
but had been paid nothing for doing so (i.e. an ultimatum game where the responder had 
undertaken the same task). Next, the participants were asked how much of their earnings 
they would have offered to a recipient who had not done the task and had no authority to 
refuse the offer (i.e. a dictator game where the recipient had done nothing), and finally 
they were asked the same question under the assumption that the recipient had done the 
same task as them but had been paid nothing for doing so (i.e. a dictator game where the 
recipient had done the same task).  
 
 











Table 2: Results   
  Ultimatum Responder Ultimatum Dictator Dictator 
  proposer   proposer allocator allocator 
(responder   (responder (recipient (recipient 
  not worked)   worked) not worked) worked) 
Lego 
Mean  £3.31  £0.93  £4.62  £0.90  £3.35 
Stand. err. £0.15  £0.12  £0.11  £0.14  £0.19 
Stand. dev.  £1.58  £1.26  £1.17  £1.50  £2.11 
Variance £2.49  £1.59  £1.38  £2.24  £4.46 
Mode  £3.00  £0.00  £5.00  £0.00  £5.00 
Median £3.00  £0.15  £5.00  £0.00  £4.00 
Range  £0 to £10 £0 to £5 £0 to £10 £0 to £10 £0 to £10 
  
Screws 
Mean  £2.92  £0.50  £4.66  £0.85  £3.75 
Stand. err. £0.13  £0.09  £0.10  £0.13  £0.17 
Stand. dev. £1.46  £0.86  £1.04  £1.40  £1.85 
Variance £2.12  £0.73  £1.08  £1.95  £3.41 
Mode  £3.00  £0.00  £5.00  £0.00  £5.00 
Median £3.00  £0.00  £5.00  £0.00  £5.00 
Range  £0 to £5 £0 to £4 £0 to £7 £0 to £5 £0 to £7 
 
 
As noted earlier, the common observation in the literature is that in the ultimatum game 
with windfall endowments, mean offers exceed 40% and modal offers are typically 50% 
of the endowment. Since the literature is quite large, these results are taken as the control. 
For the Lego building task, the mean and modal offers were 33% and 30% of the 
endowment, respectively. The comparable figures for the screw sorting task were 29% 
and 30%, respectively. With respect to responders, the common observation over 
windfall endowments is that offers less than 20% are rejected about 50% of the time; in 
this study offers of less than 20% were rejected 24% of the time in the Lego building task 
(with the mean and modal acceptable shares at 9% and 0% of the endowments, 
respectively), and 12% of the time in the screw sorting task (with mean and modal 
acceptable shares at 5% and 0%, respectively). Thus, for both tasks, earned endowments 
appear to have prompted substantially lower proposer offers and a greater willingness 
from responders to accept low offers than that typically reported with windfall 
endowments.   
 
Moreover, the results show that the Lego building task produced higher proposer offers 
and higher required acceptable offers from responders than the screw sorting task, both to 
statistically significant levels (with 1-tailed Z-scores, p = 0.024 and 0.001, respectively; 
with multiple hypothesis tests, p = 0.047 and p = 0.005, respectively – see List et al., 
2016). As aforementioned, the participants who sorted screws generally perceived their 
task as less enjoyable, and thus perhaps more effortful, than those who built the Lego 
model. Therefore, it is possible that the lower offers and lower required offers in the 
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screw sorting task were the consequence of proposers wanting to be compensated for 
greater effort, a willingness by responders to compensate for greater effort, and an 
expectation by proposers that responders would be willing to compensate for greater 
effort (NB. some of the studies summarised in Table 1 used performance rather than 
effort to determine endowment levels, and their results suggest that participants also 
consider that characteristic as relevant in considerations of desert). If that is the case, then 
there may be no significant difference between proposer offers and responder demands 
between tasks if differences in effort could be removed as a relevant consideration. This 
conclusion can be extended to the differences observed when using windfall versus 
earned endowments in that in the former the proposers have done little to nothing – in 
relation to effort, performance or any other relevant consideration – to deserve their 
endowment, which perhaps explains their relatively high offers and the responders’ 
relatively high demands.    
   
The non-incentivised results summarized in Table 2 allows us to test two further 
hypotheses (sceptics of non-incentivised responses can skip to the next section). First, by 
comparing the offers from the ultimatum game proposers with those of the dictator game 
allocators (in both cases where the responder/recipient has done nothing), we can confirm 
that strategic self-interest over and above any concern with equality in final outcomes 
appears to substantially drive ultimatum game offers, in that those offers were 
significantly higher than the dictator game allocations both for the Lego building and the 
screw sorting tasks (p < 0.001). Second, for both tasks, the proposer/allocator in the 
ultimatum/dictator game gave significantly higher offers/allocations when it was assumed 
that the responder/recipient had also done the Lego/screw task (and were paid nothing for 
doing so) than when it was assumed that they had done nothing (p < 0.001 both for Lego 
and screw sorting). This provides some further, albeit largely unincentivised, evidence 
that the responses were driven substantively by considerations of effort-based desert.  
   
 
The Policy Relevance 
 
My small study of course has many limitations, several of which have already been 
acknowledged. The participants, for example, were chosen for their convenience, and are 
hardly representative of the general population. Moreover, to reiterate, some of the 
questions were not financially incentivised – sometimes, it is argued, after considering 
the merits and demerits of different methods, but nonetheless the potential problems with 
the approach adopted are fully appreciated.  
 
Limitations aside, I contend that the results suggest that effort-based desert matters to 
people, and that if, rather than receiving windfalls, they have to earn their endowments, 
then, if asked, they will be willing to share, and be expected to share, a lower proportion 
of their endowments with others. This general conclusion applies not only to windfall 
versus earned endowments, but also across different earnings-related tasks. For example, 
a task (or indeed a job) that is perceived to be generally more effortful (or less enjoyable) 
may provoke lower levels of generosity and less punishment for an apparent lack of 
generosity than those that generally require less effort. Or at least this will be the 
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observation at face value, for if the different levels of effort are controlled for, we may 
find that generosity and punishment remain quite stable.   
 
The recognition of the importance of effort-based desert leads me to propose that 
rewarding people for their effort sustains their effort. This was reflected in Akerlof’s 
(1982) contention that a wage higher than the minimum necessary is met by employee 
effort that is higher than egoism dictates, because employees now think that employers 
deserve a fair return. In real work scenarios, there is a general acceptance of desert-based 
rewards that results in unequal distributions (Starmans et al., 2017), but, as noted above, 
the voluminous literature on the dictator and ultimatum games that uses windfall 
endowments fails to acknowledge the importance of desert. That being the case, this body 
of research lacks real world policy relevance in relation to peoples’ propensities to share 
their resources with others or, in the case of the ultimatum game, propensities to punish 
others for perceived insufficiencies in sharing, at least beyond the limited circumstances 
where one might experience windfalls. At most, this research offers only very general 
conclusions that might be relevant to policy design, principally that people often appear 
to be strategically self-interested when they are aware that they may be punished for 
blatant acts of selfishness, but, at the same time, many people like to see an element of 
distributional fairness over final outcomes if no party can claim property rights over an 
endowment.    
 
In short, the research using windfall endowments decontextualises decision-making too 
much, which is a little ironic if one is interested in real-world implications, given that the 
essence of behavioural public policy is that context matters. Of course, the research that 
uses earned outcomes also in many ways departs from the circumstances that people 
actually face – in terms of the small study reported in this article, for instance, there are 
very few people who earn an income from constructing Lego models (NB. sorting screws 
might be different – quite a few participants asked me if I was paying them to tidy up my 
garage). But by requiring participants to at least do something to earn their endowments 
the study – like those principally focussed on the dictator game summarised in Table 1 –  
took them one step closer to reality. The policy lesson emerging from this body of work 
is that people respect property rights and that there is broad recognition and acceptance of 
effort-based desert. Consequently, when considering an endowment that one party to an 
exchange has earned, the willingness of that party to share, and the tendency for other 
parties to punish a perceived lack of generosity by that person, are much closer to the 
predictions of rational choice theory than the evidence using windfall endowments, where 
close to no effort is expended by participants, typically implies.  
 
More generally, for laboratory studies of human motivations to hold relevance for policy 
design and implementation the context of the study ought to match, as far as possible, the 
circumstances that people actually face. I fear that insufficient attention is sometimes paid 
to this basic premise. For instance, in the real world some people suffer extreme 
shortages, others face moderate scarcity, and still others enjoy abundance, and different 
motivational forces will come to the fore to facilitate flourishing, or even survival, in 
these different circumstances. Behavioural experiments ought to aim to reflect these (and 
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other) circumstances to enable their results to offer better insights into what drives people 
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